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Introduction 
This paper is from a study on specialist and trade contracting in the construction industry.  
The research was commissioned by CIRIA and undertaken by the University of Reading in 
conjunction with Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners Ltd.   The purpose of the work was to 
provide guidance for effective and equitable practice in the management of projects where 
much of the work is executed, and possibly designed, by specialist and trade contractors 
(STCs).  As part of this study, a preliminary investigation into the nature and origins of 
specialist contracting was undertaken, in conjunction with a survey of the problems 
confronting STCs.  This paper presents that phase of the project. 
Background 
All construction work involves either subcontracting or separate trades contracting.  
Therefore, development of the industry depends upon specialist and trade contractors.  Herein 
lies a fundamental dilemma—the problems experienced by Specialist and Trade Contractors 
(STCs) are dominated by short term issues of business survival, whereas the development of 
an effective and efficient STC industry is a long term issue. 
   Business issues are especially difficult for subcontractors because they are inevitably 
subservient to the financial, contractual and procedural systems imposed upon them by main 
contractors.  In addition, main contractors may attempt to protect their own interests by 
transferring risk to their subcontractors. 
   An example will illustrate this.  Specialist subcontractors are particularly vulnerable when a 
significant design contribution is required from them.  Where such a subcontractor is 
appointed too late for its design to be integrated into the normal design development, the 
work can become the subject of contention because it is very likely to be out of step with both 
design and construction.  Such contention is the direct result of poor project management (i.e. 
the lateness of the appointment).  The consequential effects on the main contractor’s 
programme can have a “domino effect” on the work of other subcontractors due to variations 
and subsequent re-programming.  The main contractor then has little choice but to fight off 
claims by the other subcontractors, using any commercial or contractual means available.  
Such a situation is a direct result of a general failure to understand and manage the 
complexity of the specialists’ contribution.  Experiences like this lead employers and 
contractors to protect themselves by including their own amended clauses in the contracts 
they sign.  These are often interpreted as adversarial or onerous; typically covering issues 
related to payment, retention, liquidated damages, programme, set-off and attendance.  
Tackling these short term issues is mere fire fighting, and does nothing for the long term 
issue of developing a sound and competitive construction industry. 
  This example also illustrates the two categories of problem which always need separating.  
First, subcontracting is a mechanism for employing others without making them a part of 
one’s own organisation.  This is not a problem, as such.  It is a common feature of modern 
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commerce and need not cause any difficulty.  It becomes problematic in the construction 
industry because it is so frequently combined with other problems.  Second, specialist and 
trade contractors have particular skills and ways of working which make their role and 
contribution not only critical to the success of the project, but also very complex and difficult 
to manage.  The complexity associated with the integration of STC work is not diminished by 
any particular contract structure.  Their contribution is important, regardless of the type of 
contract.  The critical questions to focus upon are about who actually undertakes work on 
sites and about how best to harness their skills so that a positive contribution is made to the 
construction process. 
The rise of specialist contracting 
Significant factors combined to accelerate the change from direct employment to 
subcontracting and to specialist contracting.  These powerful forces apply in a wider context 
to all industries but have been particularly significant in shaping the trading patterns in the 
construction industry.  The purpose of this section is to consider the wider, general 
developments and provide a context for discussing the specific developments in the 
construction industry.  Two things become clear from considering these factors; first, why 
these trading patterns have emerged and second, why it is not plausible simply to avoid 
subcontracting and specialist contracting. 
The causes of increased levels of subcontracting 
The general increase in subcontracting has been driven by  technological, political, social and 
economic change: 
 
 As technology grows more complex, more diverse skills are needed1.  One way of 
securing competitive advantage is by being the best in a particular technology. The 
changes caused by modernisation are irreversible.  The construction industry has yet 
to accommodate them fully. 
 The UK government since 1979 has been committed to encouraging an enterprise-
based culture centred on individual initiative and reducing the influence of the public 
sector2.  This encourages those who wish to start new businesses. 
 Changes in patterns of work and career structures have led to expectations for more 
autonomy and personal control.  Coupled with a favourable tax regime at a personal 
level, this has helped to drive more people towards self-employment and 
specialisation3. 
 In responding to fluctuations in the economy, particularly the recent recessions, firms 
have concentrated on their core businesses.  Subcontracting enables them to respond 
quickly to changes in demand and gives firms much flexibility in changing the size of 
their businesses.  Similarly, as interest rates have been the government’s primary tool 
of fiscal management, firms have developed tight financial controls as a response to 
the rapid changes in the cost of borrowing4. 
                                                 
1 Lawrence, P C and Lorsch, J W  (1967)  Organisation and environment: managing differentiation and 
integration.  Harvard University Press; Massachusetts. 
2 Conservative Party Manifestos, 1979-1992. 
3 Handy, C  (1989) The age of unreason.  Arrow; London. 
4 Gray, C and Flanagan, R  (1989)  The changing role of specialist and trade contractors.  CIOB; Ascot. 
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Construction projects and capital spending have always been hit first as key regulators of 
economic activity.  This has required the construction industry to adapt more quickly than 
most.  The general trends noted above were given an extra push in the construction industry 
because of separate events: 
 
 In 1966, the government introduced Selective Employment Tax (SET), which was 
designed to tax firms on their payroll.  Firms wanted to minimise their tax liability, so 
the immediate consequence of SET was that contractors sought alternatives to 
directly-employed labour. 
 Although SET was repealed in 1972, its effects upon subcontracting were 
compounded because of the building strike in 1972 which led to a disinclination for 
general contractors to employ labour directly, and a consequent growth in subletting 
of labour.  This enabled contractors to reduce their dependency on trade union labour. 
Coupled with the effects of SET, subcontracting enjoyed a tremendous surge in 
popularity. 
These two events were mainly responsible for a sudden surge of labour-only subcontracting, 
alongside the trend towards increasing specialisation.  There have been additional influences 
at the project level, particularly the approach to design in the UK, but also the need to spread 
both economic and legal risk. 
The emergence of nominated subcontracting 
A feature of subcontracting peculiar to construction is the practice of “nomination” which has 
evolved to cope with four major issues;  
 the increasing sophistication of construction,  
 the need to modify the main contractors’ control over specialists,  
 the role of the design team,  
 the needs of clients. 
These issues are expanded below.  Nomination was a technique negotiated by representative 
bodies at UK industry level.  As such it represented the best deal for all concerned at the time 
that it was developed.  The following discussion traces the context and the rationale behind 
nomination, explaining how each sector of the industry benefited, before turning to a 
discussion of the reasons for its current unpopularity. 
 Increasing sophistication 
Increasing technological complexity has been matched by increasing numbers of specialist 
contributions to the construction process.  This is because the use of new technologies 
needs highly developed skills and expertise.  The process of technological development is 
often driven further by the increasing specialisation of those who deal with it—they 
become better at innovating.  Even those clients and designers who do not innovate for the 
sake of it find that economy of the process and market demand prompt them to use these 
new technologies.  This relentless progress modifies the very nature of the construction 
process.  The traditional assembly process is changed by the need to start procuring 
specialist elements at an early stage.  Procuring these specialist components can take 
longer than the whole building.  The answer is to specify, in advance, the installer of the 
components, leaving the main contractor no choice in the matter.  The installer can then 
prepare the components so that they are ready for installation at the appropriate time.  
Failure to do this will result in the building site being kept waiting while the components 
are procured.  The primary motivation behind nomination was the need to harness the 
skills of specialists before the main contractor was appointed.  It is one of the strongest 
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arguments for nomination and has helped to spur the growth of specialist subcontracting. 
  Specialists favoured nomination because it protected them from unbridled market forces 
by enabling them to compete on some basis other than cost.  It also enabled them to 
develop strong and stable business relationships with regular clients of the industry and 
with certain consultants.  In the event of main contractor insolvency, some construction 
contracts make provisions for direct payments to nominated subcontractors.  Further 
contractual protection arises from the provisions for adjudication of disputes between 
contractor and subcontractor. 
 Main contractors’ risk 
Main contractors tended to favour nomination since the work of nominated specialists is 
not part of the main contractors’ lump sum, but a cost-reimbursement element. In projects 
with a large amount of nominated work, the contractor is more a co-ordinator than a 
fabricator of construction work; and a conduit for specialists’ money.  
   There are contractual advantages for main contractors, especially under JCT 80.  
Examples include the fact that delays on the part of nominated subcontractors qualify for 
an extension of the contract period.  (The same is not true of civil engineering or 
government contracts.)  Under standard-form contracts, main contractors usually enjoy a 
cash discount for prompt payments and often deduct the discount even when payment is 
not prompt. 
   The lack of involvement in the selection of nominated subcontractors is seen as a 
disadvantage by main contractors. 
 The role of the design team 
Nomination was favoured by design teams because it enabled them to do two things.  
First, they could influence the quality of detail by using only their preferred specialists.  
Second, they could avoid having to detail or re-design work done by technically 
incompetent domestic subcontractors who had been selected by the main contractor on 
price alone.  Such re-design work would rarely enable the client’s design team to claim 
payment. 
   Cost consultants developed techniques of budgeting which encouraged competition 
among nominated specialists even though the main contractor was reimbursed for 
whatever was paid to such specialist subcontractors (prime cost sums).  This allowed for 
continuing design development with the subcontractors, avoiding the traditional 
contractual chain.  Also, since design liability did not apply to the main contractor, 
separate design agreements emerged to tie the specialist directly to the client.  The 
significance of these features was a growing professional infrastructure around the 
nomination process, which would indicate a vested interest in retaining the status quo. 
 The needs of clients 
Nomination protected clients’ interests by providing some certainty of performance and by 
providing a direct contractual link (via the employer/specialist design agreement) with 
those who designed the specialist work.  Many experienced clients have derived great 
benefits from developing stable business relationships with certain specialist 
subcontractors.  Nomination enabled these clients to control the main contractor’s 
selection process. 
   Main contractors working for a lump sum stand to gain the most by competitively sub-
letting their domestic subcontracts.  Clients who wish subcontractors to be selected on 
criteria other than price can take control of the selection of subcontractors through the 
nomination procedure.  This avoids the risk of choosing under-capitalised or 
inexperienced subcontractors. 
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The decline of nomination 
The whole industry co-operated in the development and growth of nomination;  it was 
popular. More recently, the practice of nomination has declined in popularity for several 
reasons: 
 The complex matrix of contracts in nomination has been at the centre of some extremely 
difficult litigation.  This has highlighted tremendous problems in the three-way 
relationship between client, contractor and subcontractor. 
 The legal problems are especially difficult when a nominated subcontractor fails to 
perform properly or becomes insolvent. 
 When the short-list of preferred specialists becomes very small, the lack of economic 
competition between them can unsettle consultants and clients. 
 Worse, since the main contractor is reimbursed for all nominated subcontract work, the 
contractor’s motivation to control expenditure might not be as strong as it would be for the 
priced work. 
 Main contractors can face enormous practical difficulties because of the special nature of 
the relationships that specialists may have with clients and contract administrators. 
 Main contractors have come to wish for as much control over specialist subcontractors as 
they have over their domestic subcontractors. 
 Continuing and increasing exposure to liability of professional consultants has driven up 
professional indemnity premiums and there has been an increasing reluctance by 
consultants to accept liability for various aspects of construction work.  By declining to 
nominate specialists, they avoid some of the liability associated with their design, co-
ordination and performance. 
For all of these reasons, the established patterns of nomination procedures are not being used. 
This  leaves building clients vulnerable to the risks associated with lowest price bidding.  It 
creates an atmosphere of tension and defensiveness that does not encourage best practice.  
The result is that the structure of the contractual relationships set up by nomination are no 
longer appropriate. 
Alternatives to nomination 
Disenchantment with the nomination processes has lead to a search for alternatives (such as 
“naming”).  The alternatives may be watered down versions of nomination and as such they 
merely make the situation less well-defined, rather than offering clear solutions to the 
problems.  
   Management contracting appeared for a while to be a better approach, but the way that it is 
used in practice is often as another version of general contracting.  There are procurement 
methods that offer more effective techniques of integration, such as design-build and 
construction management.  The former places clear responsibility for everything with the 
main contractor; the latter reduces the main contractor’s role to that of an advisor and co-
ordinator.  These offer clearer contractual structures, but in practice the relative economic 
power of the client and design team is undiminished; procurement methods do not alter the 
relative sizes of the firms involved.  Since even small quite modest projects involve 
subcontracting, the UK construction industry is now largely dependent on small specialist 
firms who do not have the economic strength to insist on terms of business that enable them 
to perform properly.  Therefore, despite continuing developments in contractual and 
procurement techniques, there is still conflict between the engines of activity, the specialist 
contractors and their clients.  The root of this is the fact that others are usually involved in the 
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transaction between specialist and client. 
 
Strategic issues for the industry 
A healthy STC sector is essential to the continuing success and development of the 
construction industry.  In some foreign industries the STC has been the focal point for 
improving efficiency and technical knowledge5.  By contrast, the development of STCs in the 
UK has been conditioned by the factors outlined above.  The constraints on the development 
of STCs have resulted in compromises that produce a far from ideal situation. 
   The economic recession has reduced the workload of contractors and specialists.  
Competition is more intense now than any time this century.  Specialist firms are being 
invited to compete for work on increasingly onerous terms as clients and contractors  seek to 
minimise their own exposure to risk.  The existence of myriad small specialist firms6 willing 
to work under onerous circumstances has enabled and encouraged these practices.  Some 
successful STCs grew into large firms, and some large firms specialised to become STCs.  
While not all STCs are small firms, it is the preponderance of small firms (with which large 
firms must compete for work) which largely dictates the patterns of business relationships in 
construction.  Therefore, although the large STC firms have, in theory, the economic muscle 
to resist onerous contracts, in practice any attempt to do so will result in the work being 
awarded to smaller, more acquiescent firms. 
   Large firms often employ small STCs as a defensive strategy. This strategy has little to do 
with the reasons that the small firms exist in the first place.  This leads to a conflict of 
motivations:  some STCs trade in this way so that they can better develop the technical 
competence that provides their competitive edge; others trade like this for purely economic 
reasons.  Those who employ STCs do so either because this is the best way to harness 
technically sophisticated systems, or simply because it is an easy way to pass risk down the 
contractual chain.  Either way, they employ STCs.  It is therefore very difficult to distinguish 
the different types of behaviour without digging a little deeper.  Indeed, for STCs and their 
employers, the two types of objective may be combined.  This fundamental conflict remains 
to be resolved—not least because of the difficulty of detection.  It is a major source of the 
problems facing the construction industry.  The problems range from lack of co-ordination, 
poor management, and low quality through to late payments, defective work and ultimately 
insolvency. 
Cash flow management 
A significant feature of construction firms is their pattern of cash flow.  Low profit margins 
and low overheads are normal in the construction industry7.  But as workload reduces and 
competition increases margins are reduced to maintain the flow of work.  In stable and certain 
conditions this would be a reasonable strategy, but construction projects are characterised by 
uncertainty.  Payments to contractors can be constrained by the client and consultant team: 
clients do not always pay promptly and consultants do not always certify fairly8. Even a good 
contractor has little power over such blatant abuses of contractual  provisions but can mitigate 
                                                 
5 Gray, C and Flanagan, R  (1989)  op cit 
6 Government Statistical Service  (1991)  DoE housing and construction statistics.  HMSO; London. 
7 Government Statistical Service  (1988)  Size analysis of UK businesses, 1988.  HMSO; London. 
8 Michael Sallis & Co Ltd v E C A Calil and Others [1987] 4 Con LJ 125; Pacific Associates and Another v 
Baxter and Others [1988] CILL 460; Chappell, D  (1989) Is it worth suing and architect?  Building Today 2 Feb, 
24-25; Bingham, A  (1992) A case to get you all steamed up.  Building 3 Jul, 36;  John Mowlem & Co plc v 
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd, Eagle Star Property Management Ltd, Eagle Star Properties Ltd, Phippen Randall 
& Parkes Ltd 10-CLD-06-01. 
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the worst effects with strong and careful management.  The contractor in turn controls 
payments to subcontractors.  The contractor can manipulate payments to subcontractors and 
suppliers to offset problems with receiving payment.  However, this behaviour can increase 
the level of uncertainty because the contract structure permits unscrupulous management and 
aggressive financial practices.  Of course, less able and less scrupulous contractors exacerbate 
such situations.  The contractual issues arising from these problems are dealt with later in this 
paper.  In this section the commercial problems are highlighted. 
The effect of delayed payment 
Contractors’ cash flows are very sensitive.  Although a contractor’s mark-up is usually 
portrayed as a proportion of the contract sum, the true picture only emerges when it is viewed 
in the light of cash flow and use of capital.  The simple fact is that contractors are paid 
periodically and pay for their supplies periodically.  This means that if they receive payment 
before they incur liability to pay their own bills, they have no capital tied up in the project.  
On the other hand, delays in the receipt of their money change the picture completely, 
especially if they cannot delay the payments they must make for their supplies.  Thus, if 
profit is related to the capital tied up in a project, it is clear that even a slight delay in 
receiving payment can turn a profit into a loss.  The same argument applies all the way down 
the contractual chain to subcontractors and their suppliers. 
   When mark-up is related to the use of capital, two things are revealed; first, the potentially 
high profits for contractors (and the appeal of such lucrative business) and second, the 
vulnerability of this return.   
   Every firm must avoid prolonged negative cash flows.  The vagaries of bankers’ lending 
policies and the manipulation of interest rates by governments add to the difficulties.  
Construction firms are particularly sensitive to disruptions in their cash flows, and therefore 
are more susceptible than most to changes in banking and government policies. 
Payment 
To reduce uncertainty it is vitally important that payments are made according to the 
agreement.  Similarly it is important that the contract documents form an accurate record of 
the agreement.  The results of the survey show that most payments are delayed.  On average, 
STCs had to wait 11.5  days beyond the period stipulated in their contract, with only 15% 
being paid on time.  The survey highlighted an interesting difference between the average 
payment periods for different sectors of the industry, see Table I. 
 
Reductions to payments 
When margins are small it is important that completed work is valued fairly and paid in full 
so that the STC’s cash flow is not threatened.  However, for the reasons given above, certain 
practices are used by main contractors to mitigate their cash flow problems.  These practices 
starve STCs of cash, thereby benefiting main contractors at STCs’ expense.  The survey 
showed that these practices are common.  Although an STC may be spared from these 
Table I:  Payment periods for different sectors of the industry 
 Payment periods: (days) 
Sector of the industry: Contractual Actual 
Building 24 34 
Civil engineering 26 35 
Services engineering 22 43 
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practices on one site, their presence on another site may easily have a “domino effect”, 
especially when the victim becomes insolvent.  
Under-valuation 
There are often disputes over the measurement and valuation of STCs’ work, particularly 
where an item has not been specified in the bill of quantities.  One reason for this may be a 
contractor’s reluctance to commit expenditure on STCs’ unspecified work before agreeing it 
with the employer.  Another is that contractors like to retain a financial buffer.  Under most 
procurement methods, contractual mechanisms are provided to protect STCs from the worst 
excesses of some contractors.  Because of this, a chain of measurement and approval follows 
the chain of contracts providing many opportunities for negotiation and dispute. 
Set-off 
Set-off can also reduce payments to subcontractors.  This covers contractors for the expense 
of employing a replacement subcontractor to finish off the work if necessary.  The survey 
revealed a high incidence of spurious counter-claims aimed at retaining as much money as 
possible.  It also showed that  genuine claims were rarely pursued through the courts and 
were usually settled by negotiation.  
Pay-when-paid 
The interviews and the survey revealed that even without a pay-when-paid clause in the 
contract it is quite common for contractors to withhold payments to subcontractors until their 
own payment has been received.  This is another technique by which contractors can protect 
their own cash flows. 
Variations 
Variations are often not valued until long after their issue, which has the effect of delaying or 
even avoiding payment for the work. Many variations occur as a natural part of the evolution 
of the design details.  This is difficult to trace and sometimes can only be adequately 
evaluated at the end of the project.  When left this late it inevitably results in claims, counter-
claims and protracted arguments.  Variations clearly attributable to the client are not as 
problematic. 
Final accounts 
Further problems arise from unreasonable delays to final account settlement.  When work is 
inadequately specified, or subject to excessive variations, there is inevitably much re-
measurement and negotiation to be done after completion.  The interviews have confirmed 
what earlier research studies9 have revealed - that contractors, clients and consultants 
sometimes have little will to settle final accounts when they have got plenty of other, more 
lucrative work to distract them. Complex projects take even longer to settle.  The final 
account process can to take up to ten years on major projects, being dependent upon the 
relationship between the client and design leader.  The delay may be influenced by the 
implications for the design leader’s PI insurance.  Because of this, contractors and especially 
subcontractors must wait much longer than the payment period specified in their contracts.   
Only contractors and STCs with large cash reserves and/or healthy cash flows on other 
projects can sustain this level of disruption to their cash flow. 
                                                 
9 Hughes, W P   (1989)  The organisational analysis of building projects.  Unpublished PhD thesis, Faculty of 
the Built Environment, Liverpool John Moores University. 
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Background to procurement options  
Much of the considerable experimentation with forms of procurement has been motivated by 
the desire to increase the interaction between the design and production processes10.  The 
traditional lack of interaction between the design and production processes11 has been 
exacerbated by the emergence of technologically sophisticated specialists whose work 
inherently involves some kind of specialist design.  The  traditional general contracting 
approach to procurement was based upon the assumption that the contractor tendered on a 
complete design, and had no design responsibility.  Since the specialist subcontractor had a 
design contribution, and since the project design team needed this design information early in 
the project, it was inevitable that the traditional approach would prove inadequate, 
encouraging the use of other approaches. 
  The following sections do not attempt to define the procurement methods as such, since that 
has already been done elsewhere12.  Instead, they focus upon the role of STCs within each 
method, and serve as an introduction to the contractual problems facing STCs and those who 
wish to use them. 
General contracting  
The most common form of procurement is still general contracting13, typified by contracts 
such as JCT 80 and ICE 6 in the UK.  There have been many developments to these basic 
forms to attempt to integrate the STC’s design into the project design team’s effort, notably 
various methods of nominating subcontractors or suppliers.  Without the formal contractual 
mechanisms of nomination, general contracting inhibits proper links between the STC and 
the design team, all communication and liability flowing through the main contractor who 
will have no design liability.  This can produce vague and uncertain patterns of responsibility 
and liability and, consequently, much dispute. 
Design and build  
Design and build is an equally established procurement method, but one that originated with 
the express purpose of establishing single-point responsibility.  Under these forms of 
agreement, typified by JCT 81 and the ICE Design and Construct contract, the contractor 
takes on complete responsibility for design and construction.  Traditionally, contractors have 
preferred to operate in this way when they have a special expertise.  Designers have rarely 
advised its use except for projects that allow limited scope for innovation.  More recently, 
however, with recessions biting into contractors’ workloads, clients have invited contractors 
to tender based on this extended liability without having to pay a premium for the increased 
contractor’s risk.  Additionally, contractors have marketed their services more vigorously, 
and showed a willingness to take on such liability.  
   Design and build places more responsibility and liability on to the contractor than any other 
form of procurement. A major feature that separates design and build from general 
contracting is the lack of an independent certifying role for the lead designer.  Without 
careful wording of the contract, it is likely that strict product liability (i.e. “fitness for 
purpose”) would attach to a design and build contractor.  
   The straightforwardness of the liabilities in design-build, by comparison with general 
                                                 
10 Honeyman, S (Chmn)  (1991) Construction management forum: report and guidance.  Centre for Strategic 
Studies in Construction; Reading. 
11 Banwell, H  (1964) The placing and management of contracts for building and civil engineering works.  
HMSO; London. 
12 Masterman, J  (1992) An introduction to building procurement systems.  Spon; London. 
13 Bound, C and Morrison, N  (1991)  Contracts in use.  Chartered Quantity Surveyor.  January, 9. 
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contracting, may not be appropriate for all types of project.  The signs are that its use is 
growing not because of its technical or legal appropriateness, but because of the general 
shortage of work coupled with the possibility that many clients may have become 
disillusioned with other approaches.  The clarity of the contract structure is appealing to 
clients and this provides a marketing opportunity to contractors.  However, unless the choice 
of designer and specialists is left to the contractor, their involvement with the project may 
muddle the contractual simplicity. 
Management contracting 
As the technological complexity of projects increased, STCs became more sophisticated and 
it became increasingly necessary to manage their contribution, both in terms of design before 
construction, and physically during construction.  In addition, commercial exigencies during 
boom periods enabled STCs and contractors to charge significant risk premiums in their 
tenders; where the contractual or commercial risks were high, tenders were high.  The logical 
conclusion to this process is that the lowest bid often came from the contractor who had 
failed to appreciate the risks involved in the project. 
   The relationship between risk and tender premiums was a critical factor in the emergence of 
management contracting.  In a technologically sophisticated development project, the 
contractual risks for the contractor are so high as to lead to inflated tenders.  The clients for such 
a project may be in a stronger position to be able to bear the risk, especially if the client is a 
property developer who builds frequently.  It is a fundamental principle of risk apportionment 
that where a client builds frequently, and has large resources, the uncertainty associated with 
contractual risk is reduced.  This is analogous to the reasoning behind the government's lack of 
fire insurance for their buildings.  They have so many buildings that the mathematical 
probability of a fire occurring somewhere approaches certainty.  Therefore it is meaningless to 
pay someone else to absorb it.  This is why it is in the interests of clients to be able to choose 
contractual forms which reduce, or eliminate, contractual risk for the contractor. 
  The dual pressures of a keener need for co-ordination, and the client’s desire to reduce the 
contractor’s exposure to risk in the main contract led to the development of management 
contracting. A management contractor was one who would be appointed at an early stage of 
the process, effectively joining the design team, to advise on management and production 
issues, ensure timely involvement of the STCs’ designers and manage the site processes14.  
The absence of contractual risk and the lack of any significant site work suited this more 
“professional” role.  The way in which management contracting was subsequently used in 
practice often ignored the reasons for its development.  The economic situation has worsened 
and there is little scope for contractors to allow for risk in their tenders for high-risk projects 
whilst they are hungry for work.  In many cases, management contracts have been amended 
by clients whose advisers fail to appreciate the reasons for relieving the management 
contractor of contractual risk.  This happens to such an extent that the disposition of risk 
becomes almost indistinguishable from that in general contracting and some of the worst 
features recur.  These  factors have combined to reduce the appeal and usage of management 
contracting. 
Construction management  
A more recent development is “construction management”.  The demand for this method of 
procurement has been fuelled by clients who have become frustrated with the difficulties of 
securing an efficient output from the industry.  In construction management, the client 
                                                 
14 CIRIA  (1984)   A Client’s Guide to Management Contracting in Building. Special Publication No 33, 
Construction Industry Research and Information Association; London. 
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employs all of the firms directly and provides the co-ordination and management through a 
consultant construction manager.  In this way a cohesive design and construction organisation 
can be created, with the client absorbing the risks associated with co-ordination.  A major 
feature of this approach is the way in which it elevates the status of the STCs to a major 
participating role which recognises their complete involvement with design and construction 
for their particular specialism.  American and European practice is often cited as the origin of 
this technique, but in the context of the need to harness STCs without using vague or 
inappropriate contract structures, it is clearly a logical development of UK practice.  In any 
event, similar practices (for example, Separate Trades Contracting) have been common in the 
UK, especially in the North of England and Scotland, until relatively recently15.  The major 
difference between UK and overseas practice is that UK designers seek to retain control over 
the final details, thereby maintaining the complexity of the information problem, but under 
the management of an integrated and controlled regime. 
The integration of STC work into the procurement method 
There are many other forms of procurement, most of which are simply variations on these 
basic themes.  All of them have arisen as a response to deficiencies in traditional systems of 
contracting16.  The traditional division between designers and constructors arises because of 
the professionalisation of design in the UK.  This is the custom in which the design team 
documents the design on behalf of the client, who then seeks tenders from contractors.  
Whilst there is nothing wrong with this in principle, its effectiveness is compromised by two 
connected factors.  First, designers in the UK are particularly skilled at developing their 
designs to a great level of detail and seek to retain control over its realisation in order to 
ensure that the details reflect the underlying design philosophy.  This is not a problem on its 
own.  Second, STCs have an increasingly important role to play in the design process, taking 
part in the development of detailed design information.  This is the root of the difficult 
problem of enabling designers to have access to specialist  knowledge without abrogating or 
compromising their own design responsibility and without breaching their liability. 
Whichever form of procurement is used, its choice should be influenced by the particular 
nature of specialist design for each project. 
Contractual issues in the procurement of STC work 
The manner of the STC’s engagement is largely dependent on the project procurement 
method.  The survey (see appendix), in common with a similar survey by CASEC17, has 
demonstrated a wide diversity in the standard forms available, as well as the fact that they are 
rarely used unamended.  The amendments may often be trivial, but they frequently result in 
an employment regime not contemplated by those who originally drafted the standard forms. 
   Amendments to contract clauses arise for two reasons.  First, contractors and clients are 
sometimes guilty of arbitrarily shifting the burden of risk on to the weakest contracting party. 
Second, contract practice should be revised continuously in order that the documents reflect 
the rapidly changing technological and commercial nature of the construction industry.  In 
other words, some of these changes to the standard forms are bad practice, others are good 
practice. 
                                                 
15 Masterman, J  (1992)  Op cit 
16 Rougvie, A  (1987)  Project evaluation and development.  Mitchell’s; London. 
17 Greenwood, D J  (1993)  Contractual arrangements and conditions of contract for the engagement of 
specialist engineering contractors for construction projects.  CASEC; London. 
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Payment  
Management practices affecting cash flow have already been mentioned.  Here we discuss 
typical contractual clauses and the amendments to standard-form contracts. 
   The biggest single difficulty experienced by STCs is in getting paid for work they have 
done18.  This has been confirmed by the survey, where payment was singled out as the most 
frequently amended standard contract clause.  It is arguable whether a main contractor should 
have to pay a subcontractor before receiving any money.  The main contractor’s view was 
succinctly put by a management contractor who was interviewed: 
If we are getting a £100,000 fee on a £3,000,000 project, are we expected to act as a 
banker guaranteeing the subcontractors’ payments?  Pay-when-paid is not onerous  
on subcontractors from our point of view.  Frequently, the clients use “shell” 
companies with no resources or capital.  How can we guarantee payment from such 
organisations or assure the subcontractors of their financial stability?  It is as 
simple as this: if we are not satisfied with a client’s financial stability, then we don’t 
build.  Therefore, if we are going ahead, then clearly there is every likelihood of 
getting paid, and we don’t need to be the client’s guarantors.  
Even though pay-when-paid clauses are not always present in subcontracts, the research has 
shown that contractors often operate in this way as a matter of policy.  However, under these 
circumstances, the lack of payment to a subcontractor is a normal commercial risk taken by 
all businesses, and the lack of a pay-when-paid clause means that the subcontractor has a 
right to legal recourse. 
   Retention is a source of payment problems.  The survey showed that the most onerous 
subcontracts tie the release of a subcontractor’s retention to the employer’s release to the 
main contractor.  Retention can present a considerable obstacle to effective cash flow and 
across the UK industry large amounts of money are tied up in this way19.  
   Most standard forms of subcontract allow the main contractor to deduct between 2.5% and 
7.5% for prompt payment to the subcontractor.  However, surveys have shown that it is 
normal practice for contractors to pay late and yet still withhold the discount20.  This may be 
due to the misleading practice in many standard forms of referring to this as a “cash 
discount”, even though the intention is clearly to create a discount for promptness.  A further 
problem is set-off.  Although set-off can be applied under English law only in strictly defined 
circumstances, it may only be prohibited with express and unambiguous provision in the 
contract.21  It was clear from the survey that spurious claims and contra-charges were causing 
severe disruptions to the cash flows of STCs.  At a time of economic recession, these 
disruptions are sufficient to render firms insolvent. 
   Clearly, many payment problems are a direct consequence of the recession.  A main 
contractor who is suffering cash flow difficulties can temporarily counteract them by 
withholding payments to subcontractors.  Thus, the solvency of one firm is assured only be 
jeopardising the solvency of another.  The problem here is that, in practice, it is very difficult 
to distinguish these causes from other, more valid causes. 
                                                 
18 Greenwood, D J  (1993)  Op cit 
19 Middleboe, S  (1992)  Subbies plan mutual option for retention.  New Builder.  1 Oct, 6. 
20 Confederation of Construction Specialists.  (1992)  Corruption of the commercial process.  CCS; Aldershot:  
Barrick, A  (1992)  Payment scandal hits subbies and clients.  Building.47 CCLVII, 20 Nov, 10. 
21 Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd. V Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. [1974] AC 689 at 717, HL, per Lord 
Diplock; C M Pilings & Co Ltd v Kent Investments Ltd (1985) 30 BLR 80 at 92, CA; Sonat Offshore SA v 
Amerada Hess Development Ltd (1987) 39 BLR 1 at 22, CA; N E I Thompson Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK 
Ltd (1987) 39 BLR 65, CA. 
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Nominated vs. domestic subcontracts  
The reasons for the development of nomination were given earlier.  It should be remembered 
that the primary motivation behind nomination was to harness the skills of specialist 
subcontractors at an early stage.  The most significant development has been the recent trend 
to oblige main contractors to use specialists without using the correct nomination procedures. 
Whilst wishing to retain control over the contractor’s choice of subcontractor, many clients 
are specifying which firm must be used, but circumventing nomination by using the 
arrangements for domestic subcontractors.  There is an inherent contradiction with this 
misuse of the contractual provisions.  Typically, general contractors in the building industry 
exclude design liability for the main contractor.  Therefore, building contractors cannot 
assume design liability for their subcontractors, whether nominated or domestic.  The STC 
must contribute design information otherwise the project cannot be built. And the designer 
must have access to that design information.  Under these circumstances, the contractor 
cannot manage the design process.  Therefore, this approach does not solve the fundamental 
design management problem and worse, it complicates and obscures the true picture. 
Design warranties  
Where specialist contractors undertake design, their appointment should be 
separated into two agreements and the design part should be subcontracted from the 
architect.  The architect should have responsibility and should not be permitted to 
pass the buck.  (Interview statement) 
Far from echoing the sentiment of the interview quote, the interviews have shown that clients 
are seeking to resolve the design contract anomaly by seeking direct warranties between 
themselves and the STCs.  These agreements are becoming very complex because each 
problem encountered by a client leads them to include an extra term in their own evolving 
standard version of a design warranty.  Whilst it may well be good practice to keep these 
documents up to date by adding new terms, it is bad practice to retain permanently every item 
which has ever been considered necessary.  This incremental approach to adding clauses 
leads to immensely complex documents covering every eventuality and requiring extensive 
legal advice merely to interpret them.  This is exemplified by the following interview extract: 
Only yesterday I received a contract document of 190 pages, much of it being the 
design warranty, for £10,000 of work. 
This typifies many of the comments made by STCs who are increasingly worried about the 
complexity of the documents they are required to price.  All of the specialist trade 
organisations interviewed said that they spend a considerable amount of their resources 
advising their members on the implications of one-off clauses. 
Liability for late completion  
A source of much discontent among subcontractors, especially small firms, is their liability in 
the event of a delay in completion.  This discontent is expressed particularly in relation to 
those subcontracts that make provision for liquidated and ascertained damages (LADs) at a 
level equivalent to the level of LADs in the main contract (an undesirable practice, as 
explained below).  To the subcontractors concerned, this seems unfair and excessive, since 
they are responsible only for part of the works, while the sums involved may well exceed 
their annual turnover.  However, from the point of view of the main contractor, a 
subcontractor who delays the completion of the entire project can cause enormous losses; not 
only any liquidated damages for which the main contractor may become liable, but also the 
prolongation costs of both the main contractor and other subcontractors (to whom the main 
contractor is liable in turn).  It would appear that if the main contractor is to be protected, 
every subcontractor must be potentially liable to this extent and further, then these liabilities 
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should all be underwritten by bank or parent company guarantees. 
   However, the temptation to provide for such stringent liquidated damages in a subcontract 
is one which should be resisted.  This is because a liquidated damages provision, in order 
avoid being struck down by the courts as a penalty, must represent a genuine pre-estimate of 
the employer’s loss which is likely to result from delay. Setting subcontract LADs at the 
same level as those under the main contract is almost bound to fail this test, since the main 
contractor will usually incur additional losses. Moreover, where a nominated subcontractor’s 
delay is a ground on which the main contractor is entitled to an extension of time, LADs will 
not be payable under the main contract at all, so that the subcontract figure will again fail the 
“penalty” test. 
Agreement to programmes  
It is ironic that an STC acting as a subcontractor is usually required to perform exactly to the 
requirements of a main contractor, even though good and comprehensive programme 
information is rarely available from main contractors22.  The requirements are particularly 
onerous when they are linked to the STC’s liability for co-ordination with the work of other 
STCs.  Together, these two factors impose an obligation upon STCs to adhere strictly to a 
poorly defined programme, and to integrate their own work with others. 
Protection of work  
A commonly found clause requires STCs to be responsible for the protection of their work 
from damage “howsoever caused”.  This can apply irrespective of whether the STC is still on 
site, and irrespective of the stage of the main contract.  Clearly, this level of risk for the STC 
is difficult to price, and expensive (if not impossible) to control. 
Responding to amended contracts  
The survey showed that over 80% of STCs qualify their bids, and the remainder add 
qualifications during the negotiations which lead to the signing of the contract.  More than 
half seek legal advice and 31% consult their trade associations.  The responses to the survey 
and information from the interviews indicate that the bidding process has two distinct stages.  
First, the STC prices the work to be done and negotiations firm this up.  The second stage is 
the negotiations about the risk elements.  STCs either seek to amend the clauses or negotiate 
a suitable payment for taking the risk.  The success of STCs in dealing with risks in this way 
is dependent upon the relative economic power of the two negotiating parties, and the extent 
to which a main contractor needs to ensure consistency between subcontracts and the main 
contract terms (commonly referred to as ensuring that the contracts are “back-to-back”). 
   The fact that so many STCs qualify their bids and enter into negotiations about contractual 
terms indicates that there are many firms who understand the significance of the risks that are 
being allocated to them.  The survey and interviews revealed that a large proportion of 
contractors, consultants and subcontractors have little real understanding of the contracts they 
are using.  The confusion, particularly with regard to standard forms of contract, is the source 
of many severe problems.  It is important for all involved in the construction process to be 
more aware of the relationships between the business deals that they do and the contracts 
which purport to record their deals.  While this problem is not unique to the construction 
industry23, the extent to which standard forms are relied upon in construction is particularly 
worrying. 
                                                 
22 Greenwood, D  (1993)  Op cit 
23 Beale H and Dugdale, A (1975)  Contracts between businessmen: planning and the use of contractual 
remedies.  British Journal of Law and Society, 2, 45-60. 
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Good commercial and contracting practice 
Many of the bad practices that have been exposed cause immense harm to the whole industry, 
not just to the immediate victims.  For example, a main contractor who forces a subcontractor 
into liquidation faces problems of disruption.  Someone in the team faces the need to find a 
replacement and the client will face escalating costs.  The discussions in this paper point to 
some clear conclusions:  
 Although nomination has declined, there remains the need to harness the skills of 
specialists at an early stage in the process.   
 Subcontract problems are dominated by misunderstanding and vagueness.   
 Procurement choice should be influenced by the nature of specialist input for the job.   
 Contracts should be negotiated and explicit: they should accurately record the deal that 
was struck.   
 These is generally insufficient awareness of the relationships between legal doctrines of 
contract and the negotiation of business deals.   
 Onerous contract terms should be avoided because they beget qualified bids, extra 
negotiations and rancour 
 Good cash flow management is essential to the success of contractors and subcontractors 
 Project requirements should be clearly defined to reduce payment uncertainty 
 Subcontractors’ potential liabilities should be underwritten 
 
Commercial practice in the construction industry will only improve when all parties 
recognise that their long term interests will be served by respecting the commercial needs of 
their trading partners. 
